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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - COMMERCE POWER AUTHO-
RIZES EXTENSION OF ADEA TO PROTECT EMPLOYEES OF
STATE GOVERNMENTS. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054
(1983).
In EEOC v. Wyoming' the United States Supreme Court held that
states may not arbitrarily force law enforcement officials2 to retire at
age 55. Wyoming had asserted immunity from the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA),3 invoking the federalism doctrine enun-
ciated in National League of Cities v. Usery.4 The 1974 amendments5 to
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)6 extended both the FLSA and
the ADEA to state employment. In contrast to FLSA's wage and hour
provisions stricken in National League,7 ADEA does not encroach so
deeply into state sovereignty as to constitute an impermissible exercise
of Congress' commerce power.' While the ability of states to comply
with ADEA without compromising the quality of their law enforce-
ment structures is the fundamental premise of the majority's opinion,9
it is the dissent's primary point of disagreement. Wyoming affects two
distinct areas of the law. First, it underscores the narrowness of Na-
tional League federalism as a limitation on the commerce power. Sec-
ond, Wyoming casts doubt upon the validity of state mandatory
retirement laws, suggesting that states develop new means for assuring
the physical preparedness of their law enforcement officials.
Political and economic exigencies have caused the growth of na-
tional power for nearly two centuries.' 0 In accordance with the princi-
ple of limited government, II courts must identify some constitutional
basis for congressional action. 12 The commerce clause 13 has served to
expand federal authority,' 4 and nearly every exercise of that authority
1. 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983).
2. A Wyoming game warden who reached age 55 was retired under Wyo. STAT.
§ 31-3-107 (1977). He complained to the EEOC, which filed suit under ADEA.
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (Supp. 1983).
4. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
5. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a)(4), 88
Stat. 55, 74 (1974).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (Supp. 1983).
7. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
8. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1062 (1983).
9. The Court relied on the ability of states to maintain their policies if they demon-
strated an adequate empirical justification for them. Id But see id. at 1071 (Bur-
ger, C.J., dissenting).
10. See generally C. SWISHER, THE GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWER IN THE
UNITED STATES 77-102 (1946).
11. That the federal government may exercise only those powers delegated to it by the
people was considered "universally admitted" in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819). See T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 9
(1868).
12. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 282-84
(1981).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
14. See SWISHER, supra note 10, at 79-90. The commerce clause is the most expansive
grant of authority to Congress. Although the taxing and spending power has a
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arguably overlaps an area within the scope of state police power.'5
Since national power is constitutionally supreme, 16 states may not in-
terfere with federal regulation of interstate commerce.' 7
Attempts to limit federal intrusion into state sovereignty have en-
joyed limited success. The bulk of state sovereignty arguments were
mooted in 1865.18 In the early 1900's the Court struck several congres-
sional acts as invading the reserved powers of the states,' 9 but the im-
mediate and practical problems created by the Depression outweighed
the Court's view of constitutionalism.2" The Court reversed itself in
several decisions, holding the tenth amendment a "truism" with no
substantive force of its own.21 The commerce power contemporane-
ously transformed from an authority to regulate only interstate com-
merce22 into an authority for dictating detailed standards to every
segment of the economy.23
Since 193624 National League25 has been the sole successful tenth
similarly broad reach, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1976); Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Comment, The Federal Conditional
Spending Power A Search For Limits, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 293 (1975), remedies
available under the commerce clause range from civil to criminal actions, and
may enlist the help of private entities by providing them with statutory causes of
action. Eg., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1976); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1964 (1976).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-87 (1981); Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 294 (1936); Cushman, The National Police Power Under
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, 3 MINN. L. REV. 289 (1919).
16. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
17. States are subject to federal regulation of such details as net weight labels on flour
bags. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977). States are also barred from
adopting rules that burden interstate commerce. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,
359 U.S. 520 (1959) (cannot require that truck tire mudguard be a certain shape
when the bulk of other jurisdictions require a different shape); Southern Pacific
Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (cannot unnecessarily limit train lengths).
18. The Civil War constituted a literal "enforcement" of the supremacy clause. For a
discussion of the conflict's constitutional significance, see A. KELLY & W.
HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 377-486 (1970).
19. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1066 n.2 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
20. One scholar suggested that the invalidation of New Deal legislation was an inci-
dent of the Court's doctrinaire "laissez faire" economic policy, which resisted gov-
ernmental social planning by invoking "substantive due process." E. CORWIN,
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. 30-32 (1941) [hereinafter cited as E.
CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION]; E. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE
SUPREME COURT 49-112 (1934); cf. Note, Separating Myth from Reality in Feder-
alism Decisions, 35 VAND. L. REV. 161, 176-77 (1982).
21. E.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941); Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). See generally E. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLU-
TION, supra note 20, at 30-32 (discussing effect of the "revolution" on the tenth
amendment).
22. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 297 (1936) (direct effect on commerce
required).
23. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Stern, The Commerce Clause and the
National Economy, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1939).
24. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
25. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
EEOC v. Wyoming
amendment challenge to federal commerce legislation.26 In National
League, Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion drew a similarity be-
tween the tenth amendment and other provisions contained in the Bill
of Rights:27 both act as limitations on federal power and are carved
from the sphere of national authority. The federal government, there-
fore, may not "directly impair the States' ability to structure integral
operations in the area of traditional governmental functions.""
The imprecision of Justice Rehnquist's opinion was criticized by
Justice Brennan and constitutional scholars.29 The National League
Court expressly reserved whether the same logic would apply to any
exercise of national power,3 ° thus threatening to disturb the carefully
developed centralized power structure. These ominous predictions
failed to materialize, however, as the Court immediately declined to
establish National League as a broad conceptual limitation on federal
authority.3' In subsequent decisions the Court refused to extend the
doctrine beyond its original scope and formulated the criteria for its
applicability.32 Wyoming, however, presented a challenge to another
section of the same act that the Court struck in National League.
Thus, while Wyoming presented the strongest case yet for extension of
the doctrine, the Court declined to do so.
In writing for the majority,3" Justice Brennan recast National
League's import as that of a "specialized immunity doctrine" 35
26. Of course, the eleventh amendment does have current vitality. See Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). In addition, the commerce power's "negative impli-
cation," see supra note 17, does not always supersede state interests. See South
Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
27. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
28. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1061 (1983). This passage is part of the
current formulation of the National League doctrine.
29. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 862, 875 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see also Gibbons, Keynote Address-Symposium." Constitutional Adju-
dication and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U.L. REV. 260, 269-70 (198 1) (criticizing
National League); Michelman, State's Rights and States' Roles." Permutations of
Sovereignty in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1103 (1977)
(same).
30. NationalLeague, 426 U.S. at 852 n.17.
31. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (states' reserved powers do not limit
fourteenth amendment legislation).
32. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 764 n.28, 758-59
(1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288
(1981); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980); Massachusetts v.
United States, 435 U.S. 444, 456 n.13 (1978); see Flax, In the Wake of National
League of Cities v. Usery, A "Derelict"Makes Waves, 34 S.C.L. REV. 649 (1983).
33. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
34. In accordance with Supreme Court procedure, the senior member of the majority
decides which Justice will write for the Court. R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN,
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 8 (1978) (quoting Rehnquist, Sunshine in the Third
Branch, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 559, 559-60 n.l (1977)).
35. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1060 (1983). Although Justice Brennan ap-
plied the test that he deplored in his National League dissent, National League,
426 U.S. at 856-80, he emasculated the conceptual basis for the National League
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designed to require that the federal government show some minimal
level of respect for state autonomy. The opinion makes clear that a
federal law must intrude on state sovereignty to an extensive degree
before National League limitations apply. Dictating to states how
much they must pay their employees is going too far; requiring them to
refrain from arbitrary discrimination is not far enough.3 6 Furthermore,
even an extreme degree of federal intrusion may be justified by an
overriding national interest. 37 Congressional action will thus be invali-
dated only in the most narrow of circumstances.
Wyoming came to the Supreme Court directly from the district
court, 38 which had granted a motion to dismiss. In this respect, the
decision was neither remarkable nor difficult. The state had asserted a
right to discriminate arbitrarily; it had not tried to show that
mandatory retirement was necessary. 39 The Court simply held that
ADEA applied, and that states must base forced retirement decisions
on a more circumspect process.4' ADEA does not ban mandatory re-
tirement per se, but merely demands that states establish an empirical
justification for these policies. The Court thus reasoned that states may
therefore comply with ADEA without abandoning their admittedly es-
sential goal of assuring physical preparedness of law enforcement offi-
cials. States may "continue to do precisely what they are doing now, if
they can demonstrate that age is a 'bona fide occupational qualificaton'
["BFOQ"] for the job. .. .
Chief Justice Burger's dissent rejected the majority's contention
that the BFOQ provision limited the ADEA's intrusion into state sov-
ereignty.42 In citing a United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit opinion that affords the exception a miserly interpretation,43
holding. Rather than an affirmative limitation on national power akin to the Bill
of Rights, the doctrine is now more analogous to a qualified affirmative defense
such as an interspousal or charitable tort immunity.
36. This is the essence of the factual distinction between Wyoming and National
League. See 3 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 98.42, at 21-18
(1982).
37. Justice Blackmun, who provided the crucial fifth vote in both Wyoming and Na-
tional League, posited a balancing approach in his National League concurrence.
NationalLeague, 426 U.S. at 86 (Blackmun, J., concurring). This view has subse-
quently been engrafted onto Justice Rehnquist's formulation as a test to apply
once the other elements have been established. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
& Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 n.29 (1981). Since Justice Blackmun
views the balancing approach as the most realistic approach to the federalism
question, the future of the National League doctrine may well depend upon where
he chooses to strike the balance.
38. EEOC v. Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. 595 (1981).
39. Id.
40. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1062 (1983).
41. Id. (emphasis supplied).
42. Id at 1071 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 1071-72 (citing Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977)). Arritt
adopted a test used in sex discrimination cases, such as Weeks v. Southern Bell
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
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EEOC v. Wyoming
Chief Justice Burger concluded that compliance with ADEA will di-
rectly impair the states' ability to function.' While the Justices agreed
on the proper analytical framework,45 they differed in their respective
estimations of the practical effects of the statute.
As a constitutional matter, the inefficacy of the BFOQ defense
would not necessarily invalidate the statute. A conjunctive three-prong
test triggers the applicability of National League.46 The first prong is
satisfied since the ADEA regulates the "states as states."4 " The BFOQ
exception eliminates the second prong because the challenged federal
act does not directly impair the state's ability to direct its functions.4a
Thus the third inquiry, whether the act invades an indisputable attri-
bute of state sovereignty, 9 was unnecessary. Similarly, the weighing of
respective state and federal interests5° was unnecessary to the Wyoming
holding. Consequently, three additional alternative bases existed for
denying National League's applicability. First, a state's right to dis-
criminate against its elderly employees may not be an attribute of state
sovereignty. Second, the federal interest in eliminating age discrimina-
tion in employment may outweigh the state interest in forcing retire-
ments. Third, ADEA may be supportable under the fourteenth
amendment. Congress clearly intended to apply ADEA to state em-
ployment,5' and its constitutional basis for so doing is quite strong.
The Wyoming Court's intention further to limit NationalLeague is
made plain by the deliberate selection of the commerce power as an
adequate basis for extending the ADEA to state employment. Several
lower courts had selected the fourteenth amendment as a basis of sup-
por52 in cases involving state discrimination against this congression-
44. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1072 (1983).
45. In Wyoming, the majority and dissent both utilized the Hodel test. Wyoming, 103
S. Ct. at 1061, 1069.
46. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981),
the Court set forth three prerequisites to a successful tenth amendment challenge
to federal commerce legislation. The challenged statute must: (1) regulate the
states "as states"; (2) address an indisputable attribute of state sovereignty; and (3)
directly impair the state's ability to structure integral operations in areas of tradi-
tional governmental functions. Id at 287-88. The textual discussion reverses the
order of the latter two prongs to clarify the basis of the Wyoming holding. Once
these elements are established, situations may remain in which the federal interest
is so important that it "justifies state submission." Id at 288 n.29.
47. ADEA in this case bears directly upon the manner in which the state operates its
own affairs rather than on the way it regulates the affairs of its citizens. EEOC v.
Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1061 n.10 (1983).
48. Id at 1062.
49. Id
50. This factor, though, may have been the unstated basis of the Court's ability to
forge a majority. See supra note 36.
51. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., EEOC v. County of Calumet, 686 F.2d 1249, 1253 (7th Cir. 1982); i H.
EGLIT, AGE DISCRIMINATION § 16.11 n. 11 (1983); LARSON, supra note 36, § 98.42,
at 21-17.
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ally protected class. 3 While the commerce clause supports laws
against private discrimination, 4 the power to enforce the fourteenth
amendment specifically applies to discriminatory state action." As the
National League doctrine is irrelevant to fourteenth amendment legis-
lation,56 ADEA can thereby apply to the states without those
limitations.
Prior to Wyoming the Supreme Court had not addressed the
BFOQ issue in the context of ADEA. The Wyoming opinion yields
scant guidance in defining that term. The test currently favored by the
federal courts of appeals, borrowed from sex discrimination cases, re-
quires that an employer demonstrate that substantially all of the class
members would be unable to perform the job.5 7 An alternate showing
that "it is impossible or highly impractical to deal with [class members]
on an individualized basis" 8 might also support the BFOQ defense.
The test has proved less demanding in the context of jobs that involve
public safety,59 reflecting realizations that certain capacities do deterio-
rate with age and that some discrimination may be tolerated in the in-
terest of preserving human life.6"
An even greater accommodation of the public safety factor was
presented by Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. ,6 where the Seventh
Circuit held that an employer need only demonstrate that it has a rea-
sonable, factual basis for concluding that elimination of its employ-
53. Age is not a suspect classification for equal protection purposes. Massachusetts
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); see also 1 EGLIT, supra note 52,
§§ 2.02-2.22, 15.02-15.12 (constitutional status of age-based classifications). Al-
though the 1974 amendments to the ADEA were not in effect when Murgia arose,
the Court retains its view that age discrimination is not constitutionally prohib-
ited. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
54. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); see G. GUNTHER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 195-211 (1980); Choper, Congressional Power to Expand Judicial Def-
initions of the Substantive Terms of the Civil War Amendments, 67 MINN. L. REV.
299 (1982).
55. See, e.g., EEOC v. County of Calumet, 686 F.2d 1249, 1253 (7th Cir. 1982);
EEOC v. Elrod, 674 F.2d 601, 604-09 (7th Cir. 1982).
56. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179-80 (1980).
57. Under the Weeks test, an employer must show "a factual reason for believing that
all or substantially all [of the class members] ...would be unable to perform
safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved." Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel-
ephone & Telegraph Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969). The strictness of the
test therefore depends on the demands of the position. See LARSON, supra note
36, § 100.16, at 21-52.
58. Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir.
1969); see also Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir. 1977) (applying
Weeks).
59. See Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 531 F.2d 224, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1981). But see
Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 966 (1977).
60. EGLIT, supra note 52, § 16.29; LARSON, supra note 36, § 100.13, at 21-52.
61. 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). See generally
EGLIT, supra note 52, § 16.25 (discussing BFOQ tests); LARSON, supra note 36,
§ 100.14 (same); Annot., 63 A.L.R. FED. 610 (1983).
EEOC v. Wyoming
ment policy would create a "minimal increase in risk of harm.'"62
Apparently only the District of Columbia Circuit follows Greyhound 63
In view of the inter-circuit conflict, the Supreme Court will likely
decide the BFOQ issue.64 Such a case will pose a dilemma for Chief
Justice Burger, who will either stand by his Wyoming dissent and con-
strue the provision as relatively meaningless, or revise that view and
thereby lessen ADEA's intrusion into state sovereignty. 65 Since the
majority emphasized the BFOQ defense6 6 as a constitutional matter,
they probably will give it life when it appears before them as an issue of
statutory construction. The confusion that attends the meaning of the
BFOQ provision was ably pointed out by the Chief Justice in his dis-
sent,67 but the Supreme Court will have to give the provision a mean-
ingful interpretation.6 s
States currently have three alternatives in light of Wyoming. First,
a state may simply replace mandatory retirement provisions with pro-
grams of individualized testing to determine competency. Second, a
state may undertake studies and accumulate evidence to formulate spe-
cific legislative findings that determine the age at which it becomes un-
reasonable to base retention on individualized testing. Third, a state
may stand fast and assert the BFOQ defense to any suits brought
against it.
States can ensure compliance with ADEA by instituting a program
of individualized testing across the board. Articulation of specific legis-
lative findings regarding the effects of aging on performance of individ-
ual jobs, although a less certain method of compliance, is more
practical. This approach is less burdensome on the states, and will
prove more persuasive to courts than wouldpost hoc rationalizations.
Several courts have indicated that strong evidence is needed to support
a BFOQ defense.69 Stereotypical assumptions about the effects of ag-
ing are clearly inadequate. 70 Moreover, medical evidence will not suf-
62. Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859, 863 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
63. Murnane v. American Airlines, Inc., 667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 915 (1982).
64. See SuP. CT. R. 17.1(a).
65. Curiously, the dissent did not cite Greyhound or Murnane, nor did it note that the
Arritt court upheld the BFOQ defense.
66. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1062 (1983).
67. Id. at 1071 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
68. The Court has denied writs of certiorari in cases that appear inconsistent with
each other. Compare Murnane v. American Airlines, Inc., 667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (broader reading of BFOQ exception), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982) with
Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 515 F. Supp. 1287 (D. Md. 1981) (exception nar-
rowly construed), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 944 (1982). See generally James &
Alaimo, BFOQ.'4n Exception Becoming the Rule, 26 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 (1977)
(criticizing broad application of BFOQ exception).
69. See LARSON, supra note 36, § 100.12, at 21-50; id § 100.13, at 21-52.
70. See Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 515 F. Supp. 1287 (D. Md. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 455 U.S. 944 (1982). But see Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d
19831
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fice unless it can be shown that individual testing will not uncover
incapacities that might ultimately jeopardize human safety.7'
Wyoming signals the continued constriction of the National
League federalism doctrine. Although the fourteenth amendment has
intuitive appeal as a basis for supporting ADEA's applicability to state
employment, the Court held that the commerce clause authorizes
ADEA's extension. It is significant, however, that the Court retained
the conceptual basis of National League without limiting it to such a
degree as to overrule it sub silentio. The Wyoming decision is consis-
tent with this notion because the existence of the BFOQ defense ren-
ders the ADEA relatively inoffensive to state sovereignty. States
remain in control of their employment policies so long as the policies
survive comparison to a reasonable federal standard.
Steven Scott Stephens
859, 863 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). Excellent reasons for
rejecting popular beliefs concerning the effects of aging are found in C. EDELMAN
& I. SIEGLER, FEDERAL AGE DISCRIMINATION LAW 11-36 (1978).
71. See Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 515 F. Supp. 1287 (D. Md. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 455 U.S. 944 (1982).
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